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Current Circuit Splits 
The following pages contain brief summaries, drafted by the 
members of the Seton Hall Circuit Review, of issues of first impression 
identified by federal court of appeals opinions announced between 
March 2, 2011 and August 31, 2011. This collection is organized by civil 
and criminal matters, then by subject matter. 
Each summary briefly describes a current circuit split. It is intended 
to give only the briefest synopsis of the circuit split, not a comprehensive 
analysis. This compilation makes no claim to be exhaustive, but will 
hopefully serve the reader well as a reference starting point. 
Preferred citation for the summaries below: First Impressions, 8 
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Remedies – Privacy Act:  Shearson v. U. S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
638 F.3d 498 (6th Cir. 2011) 
The 6th Circuit addressed the issue of “whether the Privacy Act’s 
general exemptions provision, § 522a(j), permits an agency to wholly 
exempt systems of records from the civil-remedies provision, § 552a(g), 
and thereby avoid all civil liability, even for violations of non-exemptible 
provisions.”  Id. at 502.  The court noted that the 4th, 7th, and 9th 
Circuits determined that “an agency can exempt itself from § 552a(g) by 
properly promulgating rules.”  Id. at 502–03  The D.C. Circuit however, 
had found “that an agency cannot escape liability for violating non-
exemptible Privacy Act obligations simply by exempting itself from the 
2011] Current Circuit Splits 141 
 
Act’s civil-remedy provisions; rather, an agency may exempt a system of 
records from the civil-remedies provision only to the extent that the 
underlying substantive duty is exemptible under § 552(a)(j).”  Id. at 503.  
The 6th Circuit agreed with the D.C. Circuit in finding that “an agency is 
permitted to exempt a system of records from the civil-remedies 
provision if the underlying substantive duty is exemptible under              
§ 552a(j).”  Id. at 504.  The court disagreed with the 4th, 7th, and 9th 
Circuits, stating: “§ 552a(g) provides the general civil remedies for both 
exemptible and non-exemptible obligations, it is reasonable to conclude 
that Congress intended that the remedy follow the violation, i.e.,             
§ 552a(g) is applicable to non-exempted violations.”  Id. at 503.  Thus, 
the 6th Circuit concluded that an agency is not permitted to exempt a 
system of records from “claims alleging violation of non-exemptible 
Privacy Act provisions . . . .”  Id. at 504. 
BANKRUPTCY 
Chapter 11 – Plan Cramdown Requirements Under 11 U.S.C. § 
1129(b)(2)(A):  River Rd. Hotel Partners, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 
651 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2011) 
The 7th Circuit addressed whether 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A) 
requires that cramdown plans under subsection (iii), that contemplate 
selling encumbered assets free and clear of liens at an auction, satisfy the 
requirements set forth in Subsection (ii) of the statute.  Id. at 649.  The 
court noted that the 3rd and 5th Circuits determined that “Subsection 
(iii)’s scope was not limited by its neighboring subsections and that the 
proceeds from the sale of encumbered assets constituted the “indubitable 
equivalent” of the secured creditors’ claim.  Id.  It also noted that the 3rd 
Circuit’s dissent found “that the majority’s reading of the statute was at 
odds with the text of the statute itself, various canons of statutory 
interpretation, the statute’s legislative history, interests expressed in other 
parts of the Code and the settled expectations of lenders and borrowers.”  
Id. at 648.  The 7th Circuit agreed with the 3rd Circuit’s dissent in 
finding that, “Subsection (ii), which offers the standard protections to 
creditors, [provides] the only way for plans seeking to sell encumbered 
assets free and clear of liens to obtain fair and equitable status.”  Id. at 
653 (internal quotations omitted).  The court disagreed with the 3rd and 
5th Circuits as “[u]nder their interpretation, plans could qualify for 
treatment under Subsection (iii) even if they seek to dispose of 
encumbered assets in the ways discussed in Subsections (i) and (ii), but 
fail to meet these Subsections’ requirements.”  Id. at 652. The 7th Circuit 
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stated that their sister courts’ “reading of Subsection (iii) would nullify 
its neighboring subsections and ignore the protections for secured 
creditors recognized in other Code provisions[.]”  Id. at 653.  Thus, the 
7th Circuit held “that the Code requires that cramdown plans that 
contemplate selling encumbered assets free and clear of liens at an 
auction satisfy the requirements set forth in Subsection (ii) of the 
statute.”  Id. at 653. 
Chapter 12 – Post-Petition Income Tax:  United States v. Dawes (In re 
Dawes), 652 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 2011) 
The 10th Circuit addressed whether income taxes generated from 
the sale of a farm asset during a Chapter 12 bankruptcy are taxes 
“incurred by the estate” as expressed under 11 U.S.C.S. § 503(b), and 
thus subject to downgrade and discharge.  Id. at 1238–39.  The court 
noted that the 9th Circuit determined that the taxes are not subject to 
downgrade and discharge because they are not “incurred by the estate,” 
while the 8th Circuit found the opposite.  Id. at 1239.  The 10th Circuit 
agreed with the 9th Circuit that the term “incurred by the estate” should 
be interpreted according to its plain language, and because a Chapter 12 
estate is not liable for post-petition federal income taxes, the estate 
cannot incur the tax liability.  Id. at 1240.  The court disagreed with the 
8th Circuit that “incurred by the estate” means tax incurred during 
bankruptcy.  Id.  Thus, the 10th Circuit held post-petition income taxes 
generated during Chapter 12 proceedings “are liabilities of the individual 
debtor and not the bankruptcy estate,” and therefore, “they are not within 
the purview of the bankruptcy proceedings or included in the 
reorganization plan.”  Id. at 1239. 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Appeals – Costs & Attorney Fees:  Int’l Floor Crafts, Inc. v. Dziemit, 
420 Fed. App’x. 6 (1st Cir. 2011) 
The 1st Circuit addressed whether appellate attorney’s fees may be 
included in an appeal bond.  Id. at 17.  The court noted that the 2nd, 6th, 
9th, and 11th Circuits determined that a bond issued under Federal Rule 
of Appellate Procedure 7 may include appellate attorney’s fees if the 
applicable statute underlying the litigation contains a fee-shifting 
provision that accounts for such fees in its definition of recoverable 
costs, and the appellee is eligible to recover them.”  Id.  The 3rd and D.C. 
Circuits, however, found Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39(e) “to 
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restrict the costs calculable for Rule 7 purposes . . . .”  Id. at 17–18.  The 
1st Circuit agreed with the 2nd, 6th, 9th, and 11th Circuits in finding that 
“[c]ourts understand . . . fee shifting statutes to account for appellate fees 
as well.”  Id. at 17.  The court disagreed with the 3rd and D.C. Circuits, 
as “[those] cases presented distinguishable circumstances since neither 
involved a fee-shifting statute.”  Id. at 19.  Thus, the 1st Circuit 
concluded that a district court may include attorney fees in an appellate 
bond when “the applicable statute underlying the litigation contains a 
fee-shifting provision . . . and appellee is eligible to recover them.”  Id. at 
17. 
Choice of Law – Forum Selection Clauses:  Slater v. Energy Servs. 
Group Int’l, 634 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2011) 
The 11th Circuit addressed whether courts should analyze a forum 
selection clause under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) or Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(3).  Id. at 1332.  The court observed that the 6th Circuit 
enforced a forum selection clause under § 1404, while the 2nd and 9th 
Circuits enforced international forum selection clauses under Rule 
12(b)(3).  Id.  The 11th Circuit noted that it applied Rule 12(b)(3) to a 
motion to dismiss based on a forum selection clause which mandated a 
foreign venue. Id.  The court noted that the Supreme Court previously 
held that “motions to dismiss based upon forum-selection clauses are 
cognizable as motions to dismiss for improper venue.” Id. at 1333 
(internal citation omitted).  The court extended this holding to motions to 
dismiss based on a domestic forum selection clause, adopting a broad 
interpretation of the Supreme Court’s aforementioned holding.  Id. at 
1333.  Thus the 11th Circuit concluded “that § 1404(a) is the proper 
avenue of relief where a party seeks the transfer of a case to enforce a 
forum-selection clause, while Rule 12(b)(3) is the proper avenue for a 
party’s request for dismissal based on a forum-selection clause.”  Id. at 
1336. 
Standard of Review – Plain Error:  U.S. v. Cordery, 656 F.3d 1103 
(10th Cir. 2011) 
The 10th Circuit addressed “whether an error must be plain at the 
time of trial or merely at the time of appeal.”  Id. at 1107.  The court 
noted that the 9th and D.C. Circuits have determined that “an error is 
plain only if it was clear at the time of the district court’s decision,” 
while the 7th and 11th Circuits have stated that “plain error is measured 
at the time of appeal . . . .”  Id.  The 10th Circuit agreed with the 7th and 
11th Circuits in finding that “this approach has the advantage of avoiding 
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the necessity of distinguishing between cases in which the law at the time 
of appeal on the one hand and cases in which it was merely unsettled on 
the other.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court disagreed 
with the 9th and D.C. Circuits that an error is plain only where the law is 
well settled at the time of trial.  Id.  Thus, the 10th Circuit concluded that 
plain error is measured at the time of appeal.  Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Federal Employees – Remedies under the Civil Service Reform Act:  
Elgin v. U. S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 641 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2011) 
The 1st Circuit addressed “whether there is some implied exception 
to the exclusive [Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA)] remedy [where] the 
challenge [to termination of employment] . . . is a constitutional one 
sounding in equity.”  Id. at 11.  The court noted that the 3rd and D.C. 
Circuits have held that there was an implied exception to the exclusive 
CSRA remedy and that federal employees may bring to federal court 
constitutional claims relevant to their removal.  Id. at 11.  Alternatively, 
the 2nd and 10th Circuits found that the CSRA remedies were wholly 
exclusive and that CSRA employees must bring their constitutional 
challenges before the Merits Systems Protection Board, as provided 
under the CSRA.  Id. at 11.  The 1st Circuit agreed with the 2nd and 10th 
Circuits, based on its own precedent, its reading of Supreme Court 
precedent, and its interpretation of the CSRA’s legislative history.  Id.  
Thus, the 1st Circuit held that there is no implied exception to the 
exclusive CSRA remedy.  Id. 
First Amendment – Retaliatory Arrest Claim:  Howards v. 
McLaughlin, 634 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2011) 
The 10th Circuit addressed whether a plaintiff bringing a First 
Amendment retaliation claim against the government “must show that 
the defendants lacked probable cause for the arrest.”  Id. at 1147.  The 
court noted that the 6th, 8th, and 11th Circuits determined that plaintiffs 
are required to show lack of probable cause for a retaliatory arrest, while 
the 9th Circuit found plaintiffs may bring a First Amendment retaliation 
claim even where probable cause existed for the arrest.  Id.  The 10th 
Circuit agreed with the 9th Circuit in finding that plaintiffs must prove 
the absence of probable cause only in malicious prosecution claims and 
other retaliation cases involving “complex” causation. Id. at 1148–49.  
The court disagreed with the 6th, 8th, and 11th Circuits’ interpretation 
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that the Supreme Court had created a “no-probable-cause” requirement 
in all First Amendment retaliation cases.  Id. at 1148.  Thus the 10th 
Circuit concluded that plaintiffs are not required to show an absence of 
probable cause in retaliatory arrest cases under the First Amendment.  Id. 
at 1148–49. 
Property Rights – Prisoner’s Property Rights in Unearned Interest:  
Young v. Wall, 642 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2011) 
The 1st Circuit addressed the issue of whether “a prison’s unilateral 
suspension of its internal policy of paying interest on inmate accounts 
violated the constitutional rights of an affected inmate.”  Id. at 51.  The 
court stated that in order to establish constitutionally protected property 
interest, the plaintiff must point to a source that gives rise to such a right.  
Id. at 53.  The court then noted that the 4th and 11th circuits concluded 
that no such right regarding unearned future interest existed.  Id. at 54. 
The court also noted that the 9th Circuit came to an opposite conclusion 
by applying “the mantra that interest follows principal,” but criticized 
that conclusion because it failed to give “due weight to the truncation of 
prisoner’s property rights that is characteristic of common law”  Id. at 54.  
After analyzing Rhode Island common law, statutory law, and policy and 
practice, the court agreed with the 4th and 11th Circuits and concluded 
that none of these could provide a source of property rights in unearned 
future interest.  Id. at 53–55.  Finding no property rights in collecting the 
interest, the court ultimately held that “prison inmates lack a 
constitutionally protected property right in interest not yet paid.”  Id. at 
51. 
Speech and Debate Clause – Scope of Application:  United States v. 
Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2011) 
The 9th Circuit addressed whether a district court must “hold a 
Kastigar-like hearing to determine whether the Government used 
evidence protected by the Speech and Debate Clause to obtain non-
privileged evidence” against a Member of Congress.  Id. at 1019.  The 
court noted that the D.C. Circuit determined that the Clause is violated 
when privileged materials are reviewed without the Member of 
Congress’s consent because it distracts Members and their staffs from 
their legislative work.  Id. at 1033.  However, the 9th Circuit rejected this 
rationale finding that legislative distraction alone cannot serve “as a 
touchstone for application of the Clause’s testimonial privilege,” but 
rather, “distraction alone precludes inquiry only when the underlying 
action is itself precluded.”  Id. at 1034–35.  The 9th Circuit added that a 
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broad privilege would result in a violation of the Clause every time a 
court reviewed evidence merely to determine whether the Clause applied 
or not.  Id. at 1038–39.  Thus the 9th Circuit concluded that no 
requirement for a Kastigar hearing exists where the actions and choices 
for which the Member of Congress was being prosecuted were beyond 
the scope of the Speech and Debate Clause.  Id. at 1039. 
EMPLOYMENT 
Benefits – Deference to Administrative Agencies:  Weight Loss 
Healthcare Ctrs. of Am., Inc. v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 655 F.3d 1202 
(10th Cir. 2011) 
The 10th Circuit considered whether it owed deference to the 
Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) interpretation of a federal 
employee insurance plan.  Id. at 1205.  The court noted that the 8th and 
11th Circuit deferred to OPM’s interpretation because OPM has relevant 
expertise and was given broad authority to regulate the field by 
Congress.  Id. at 1207.  The court then noted that the 4th Circuit 
disagreed with this view “because contract interpretation is a question of 
law clearly within the competence of courts.”  Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  The court disagreed with the 4th Circuit, finding that an 
earlier decision from the 4th Circuit was contrary, and that “[i]t ignore[d] 
OPM’s experience and expertise as well as the statutory scheme that 
gives OPM the primary and principal role of interpreting health-plan 
contracts with federal employees.”  Id.  Thus, the 10th Circuit agreed 
with the 8th and 11th Circuits and held that OPM’s interpretation of the 
federal employee insurance plan “is entitled to deference because of its 
intimate and extensive involvement in the negotiation and interpretation 
of federal health-insurance plans.”  Id. at 1205. 
FAMILY LAW 
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) – Burden of Proof:  Sanders 
v. City of Newport, 657 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 2011) 
The 9th Circuit addressed whether an employer or employee bears 
the burden of proof to establish a reason for failing to reinstate an 
employee when an employer, defending against a Family and Medical 
Leave Act (FMLA) interference claim, “alleges that he had a legitimate 
reason not to reinstate an employee.”  Id. at 779.  The court noted that the 
8th, 10th, and 11th Circuits “have all held that [Department of Labor 
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(DOL) Regulations 29 C.F.R. § 825.216(a)] validly shifts to the 
employer the burden of proving that an employee . . . would have been 
dismissed regardless of the employee’s request for, or taking of, FMLA 
leave.”  Id. at 780 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).  The 7th 
Circuit, however, relied on its previous case law interpreting the statute, 
rather than the plain text of the regulations, and held that the burden of 
proof remains with the employee.  Id.  The 9th Circuit found the majority 
rule to be “more natural” and agreed that “the plain language of the 
pertinent DOL regulations provides that the burden is on the employer to 
show that he had a legitimate reason to deny an employee reinstatement.”  
Id.  The court also found persuasive the fact that this approach is 
consistent with “the Supreme Court’s admonition that the burden of 
proof should conform with a party’s superior access to the proof.”  Id.  
Thus, the 9th Circuit concluded “that when an employer seeks to 
establish that he has a legitimate reason to deny an employee 
reinstatement, the burden of proof on that issue rests with the employer.”  
Id. 
IMMIGRATION 
State Enforcement – Immigration and Naturalization Act:  United 
States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S.Ct. 
845 (2011) 
The 9th Circuit addressed whether states have “inherent authority to 
enforce the civil provisions of federal immigration law.”  Id. at 362.  The 
court noted that the 6th Circuit determined that states do not have such 
inherent authority, while the 10th Circuit determined that they do.  Id. at 
363.  The 9th Circuit agreed with the 6th Circuit in finding that, under 8 
U.S.C. § 1357(g), “local law enforcement officers [could not] enforce 
completed violations of civil immigration law” absent specific 
authorization from the Attorney General.  Id.  The court disagreed with 
the 10th Circuit’s finding that Congress presumed states had this power 
when it enacted 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c) and 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10).  Id. 363–
64. The court found the 10th Circuit’s interpretation of legislative history 
unpersuasive because Congress would not have intended “‘to displace 
pre-existing . . . authority’ when its purpose . . . was to grant authority it 
believed was otherwise lacking.”  Id. at 365.  The court also found the 
10th Circuit’s reasoning unpersuasive because such reasoning requires a 
broad reading of § 1357(g)(10), which the 9th Circuit refused to grant.  
Id.  Thus, the court concluded that states do not possess any inherent 
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authority to “enforce the civil provisions of federal immigration law.”  
Id. at 365. 
TAX 
Tax Reform Act – Interpreting 26 U.S.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A) and 
6229(c)(2):  Intermountain Ins. Service of Vail v. C.I.R., 650 F.3d 691 
(D.C. Cir. 2011) 
The D.C. Circuit addressed the issue of “how to interpret [I.R.C. §] 
6501(e)(1)(A)’s ‘omits from gross income’ language in cases that fall 
beyond subsection (i)’s scope.”  Id. at 703.  The court noted that the 4th, 
5th, 9th, and Federal Circuits determined that the Supreme Court 
decision of Colony, Inc. v. Comm’r, 357 U.S. 28 (1958), interpreting      
§ 275(c), applies to the relevant section.  Id. at 700.  The 7th Circuit, 
however, found “that Colony does not control and that the 
Commissioner’s interpretation of sections 6501(e)(1)(A) and 6229(c)(2) 
so aligns with Congress’s clear intent that the Commissioner had no need 
even to rely on the regulations.”  Id.  The D.C. Circuit agreed with the 
7th Circuit in finding that Colony was not controlling “because that 
decision provides only the best, but not the exclusive, construction of the 
phrase ‘omits from gross income . . . .’”  Id.  The court disagreed with 
the 4th, 5th, 9th and Federal Circuits as it found that neither the plain 
meaning of the text, the section’s structure, the legislative history, the 
passages’ context, nor the reenactment history bars the Commissioner’s 
interpretation of § 6501(e)(1)(A).  Id. at 698.  Thus, the D.C. Circuit 
concluded that the “Court in Colony never purported to interpret 
§ 6501(e)(1)(A),” and that nothing in the relevant section 
“unambiguously forecloses the Commissioner from interpreting 
‘omissions from gross income’ as including basis overstatements.”  Id. at 
705. 
TORTS 
Awarding of Costs – Translation Costs in Litigation:  Kouichi 
Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 633 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 2011) 
The 9th Circuit addressed whether a district court may interpret 28 
U.S.C. § 1920(6) in such a way that awards the costs of translation 
services to the defending party in a tort action.  Id. at 1221.  The court 
noted that the 7th Circuit had determined that the words “interpretation” 
and “translation” have distinct definitions and declined to award 
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translation service costs.  Id.  The 7th Circuit specifically construed § 
1920(6) to embody the common understanding of an “interpreter” as one 
who translates the spoken word, and found that the dictionary definition 
of “interpreter,” meaning one who translates a written document, 
unreasonably stretched the meaning of § 1920.  Id.  “The 6th and D.C. 
Circuits concluded that ‘translation’ services and ‘interpretation’ services 
are interchangeable.”  Id.  The court reasoned that the 6th Circuit’s 
analysis “is more compatible with Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which includes a decided preference for the award of costs to 
the prevailing party.”  Id.  The 9th Circuit joined the 6th and D.C. 
Circuits in holding “that within the meaning of § 1920(6), the prevailing 
party should be awarded costs for services required to interpret either 
live speech or written documents into a familiar language, so long as 
interpretation of the items is necessary to the litigation.” Id. at 1221–22.  
Thus, the 9th Circuit held that § 1920(6) permits courts to award costs 
for translation services to defending parties.  Id. at 1222. 
Torture Victim Protection Act – Corporate Liability:  Doe v. Exxon 
Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
The D.C. Circuit addressed whether corporations can be held liable 
for aiding and abetting violations of the Torture Victim Protection Act 
(TVPA).  Id. at 58.  The court noted that the 9th Circuit held that 
corporations may not be held vicariously liable under the TVPA, while 
the 11th Circuit found corporations can be liable.  Id.  The D.C. Circuit 
agreed with the 9th Circuit in finding that the statutory text of the TVPA 
does not permit liability of corporations.  Id.  The court based its opinion 
on the absence of any statutory text permitting vicarious corporate 
liability, and added that, although Congress may provide for such a 
theory of liability, it has not done so.  Id.  Thus, the D.C. Circuit 
concluded that corporations cannot be held liable for aiding and abetting 
violations of the TVPA.  Id. 
 




Ex Post Facto Clause – Sentencing Guidelines:  United States v. 
Wetherald, 636 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 2011) 
The 11th Circuit addressed whether the “application of the 
Sentencing Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing violated the Ex 
Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution.”  Id. at 1318.  The court 
noted that the 7th Circuit determined that the Ex Post Facto Clause does 
not apply to advisory regulations like the Sentencing Guidelines, while 
the D.C. Circuit found the application of a harsher Guidelines range 
presents a constitutional problem.  Id. at 1320–21.  The D.C. Circuit 
found that a constitutional right was violated if “the district court’s 
failure to employ the Guidelines in effect at the time the offense was 
committed resulted in ‘a substantial risk’ of a more severe sentence.” Id. 
at 1321.  The 11th Circuit agreed with the D.C. Circuit in finding that the 
Sentencing Guidelines, though advisory, implicate the Ex Post Facto 
Clause because the D.C. Circuit’s approach “recognizes the ongoing 
importance of the Sentencing Guidelines while maintaining the district 
Court’s broad discretion to consider relevant information in formulating 
an appropriate sentence.” Id. at 1322–23.  The 11th Circuit concluded 
that a court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines in effect at the 
time of sentencing will violate the Ex Post Facto Clause only when this 
choice results in a substantial risk of harsher punishment.  Id. at 1322–
23. 
CRIMINAL OFFENSES 
Money Laundering – Elements under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956:  United 
States v. Quinones, 635 F.3d 590 (2d Cir. 2011) 
The 2nd Circuit addressed whether “proceeds of specified unlawful 
activity,” are limited to “profits” where the unlawful activity is the sale 
of contraband under the federal money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 
1956.  Id. at 597.  The court noted that the 11th Circuit held that 
“proceeds” are limited to “profits” only where the unlawful activity is an 
illegal gambling operation.  Id. at 599.  The 8th and 9th Circuits 
determined that “proceeds” are not limited to “profits” where the 
unlawful activity is a drug offense.  Id. at 599.  The 5th and 6th Circuits, 
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however, found that “proceeds” are limited to “profits” only where the 
conviction raises a “merger problem” and where the legislative history 
suggests this narrow reading.  Id.  The 2nd Circuit agreed with the 5th 
and 6th Circuits in finding that Supreme Court precedent requires an 
examination of legislative history.  Id. at 599.  The court disagreed with 
the 11th Circuit in finding that it was required to interpret “proceeds” as 
“profits” only in cases involving an illegal gambling operation.  Id. at 
599.  Thus, the 2nd Circuit concluded that Congress did not intend to 
limit “proceeds” to “profits” where the unlawful activity is the sale of 
contraband.  Id. at 600. 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Fourth Amendment – Probable Cause:  Dougherty v. City of Covina, 
654 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2011) 
The 9th Circuit addressed “whether evidence of child molestation, 
alone, creates probable cause for a search warrant for child pornography.”  
Id. at 899.  The court noted that the 2nd and 6th Circuits determined that 
evidence of child molestation alone was insufficient to establish probable 
cause, while the 8th Circuit determined that evidence of child 
molestation was sufficient, as there was an “intuitive relationship 
between acts such as child molestation or enticement and possession of 
child pornography.”  Id.  The 9th Circuit, explaining that “the question of 
probable cause is not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of 
legal rules,” employed a totality of the circumstances test.  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Thus, the 9th Circuit determined that evidence 
of child molestation, under the totality of the circumstances approach, 
could create probable cause to search for child pornography in some 
instances, though it does not establish probable cause categorically.  Id. 
Fourth Amendment – Search Warrant:  United States v. Bailey, 652 
F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2011) 
The 2nd Circuit addressed whether it is permissible under the 
Fourth Amendment to detain a person who leaves a premises subject to a 
search warrant immediately before or during the search.  Id. at 204.  The 
court noted that the 5th, 6th, and 7th Circuits determined that detainment 
is permissible, while the 8th and 10th Circuits found the opposite.  Id. at 
204–06.  The 2nd Circuit agreed with the 5th, 6th, and 7th Circuits in 
finding that the interests in law enforcement safety and evidence 
preservation outweighed the individual’s de minimis intrusion of being 
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briefly detained.  Id. at 205.  The court disagreed with the 8th and 10th 
Circuits, which held that officer safety would not be jeopardized and that 
evidence would not be put at risk of being destroyed if the suspect was 
not detained.  Id. at 205–06.  Thus, the 2nd Circuit concluded that 
detaining an individual in the process of leaving a premises subject to a 
search warrant as soon as practicable does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.  Id. at 206. 
4th Amendment Warrantless Search – Burden of Proof:  Bogan v. 
City of Chicago, 644 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 2011) 
The 7th Circuit addressed the question of which party bears the 
burden of proving exigent circumstances in a § 1983 warrantless-search 
action where the police claim that the search was justified based on said 
exigent circumstances.  Id. at 568.  The court first recognized its prior 
agreement with the 2nd Circuit determination that the plaintiff bears the 
ultimate burden of nonpersuasion in a civil case, regardless of whether 
the justification is based on consent or some other recognized exception.  
Id. at 569.  It went on to state that a preexisting split was well-defined: 
the 3rd and 10th Circuits place the burden of proof on the officers and 
the 2nd, 5th, 7th and 11th Circuits place the burden on the plaintiff.  Id.  
Next, the court highlighted its own prior precedent, in which it adopted a 
burden-shifting scheme applicable to the related issue of consented-to 
searches.  Id. at 568.  While the preexisting split only specifically relates 
to the allocation of the burden of proof in other Fourth Amendment 
claims (establishing consent in a warrantless arrest and in an arrest 
without probable cause), the court considered this inquiry related to the 
narrower issue at hand: determining the burden of proof with regard to 
exigent circumstances in a warrantless search action.  Id.  In line with its 
prior precedent regarding consented-to searches, the court rejected the 
10th Circuit’s reasoning and placed the burden of proof on the plaintiff to 
establish the absence of exigent circumstances.  Id. at 569.  The court 
explained that the extension of its prior holding was appropriate because 
a common 4th Amendment violation occurs in both consent and exigent 
circumstance cases.  Id. at 568.  Thus, the 7th Circuit held that where the 
officers come forward with proof of exigent circumstances, the question 
posed to the jury is whether or not the plaintiff has met her ultimate 
burden of showing that the search was unreasonable in the light of the 
existing circumstances.  Id. at 571. 
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Fifth Amendment – Custodial Interrogation:  Burlew v. Hedgpeth, 
No. 09-17788, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 17323 (9th Cir. Aug. 18, 2011) 
The 9th Circuit addressed “whether a defendant is ‘in custody’ 
when he is detained in the back of a police car.”  Id. at *4.  The court 
noted that the 4th and 6th Circuits, and a previous 9th Circuit case have 
determined that a defendant was in custody where the defendant was not 
under arrest but was detained in a police car, while the 7th and 8th 
Circuits determined that a defendant was not considered to be “in 
custody” for purposes of Miranda warnings while questioned in the back 
seat of a squad car.  Id.  The court then noted that “the Supreme Court 
has emphasized that the determination of whether a defendant was in 
custody for Miranda purposes is a general one, which affords courts 
more leeway . . . in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.”  
Id. at *4–5 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Thus, the 9th Circuit, 
without reversing its prior case, held that a state does not unreasonably 
apply federal law in finding that a defendant was not in custody when 
placed in the back of a police car.  Id. at *5. 
Fifth Amendment – Non-evidentiary Use of Self-Incriminating 
Statements:  United States v. Slough, 641 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
The D.C. Circuit addressed whether a prosecutor can make non-
evidentiary use of immunized testimony.  Id. at 553.  The court noted 
that the 3rd and 8th Circuits suggested that “non-evidentiary uses of 
immunized testimony are barred,” while the 1st, 2nd, 7th, 9th, and 11th 
Circuits held to the contrary.  Id.  The D.C. Circuit agreed with the 1st, 
2nd, 7th, 9th and 11th Circuits in finding that Supreme Court precedent 
was unconcerned with the “exercise of prosecutorial discretion.”  Id. at 
554 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court stated that to decide 
otherwise “would entangle the court in what has hitherto been internal 
prosecutorial decision-making.  And it would open a new field for 
courts’ having to make complex causal judgments of the sort already 
required to assure clean evidence.”  Id.  Thus, the D.C. Circuit concluded 
that prosecutors can use such immunized statements, at a minimum, in 
forming decisions to indict.  Id. 
Mandamus Petitions – Crime Victims’ Rights Act:  United States v. 
Monzel, 641 F.3d 528 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
The D.C. Circuit addressed the appropriate standard of review for 
petitions for mandamus filed pursuant to the Crime Victims’ Rights Act 
(CVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3771.  Id. at 532.  The court observed that the 5th, 
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6th, and 10th Circuits apply “the traditional standard for mandamus, 
under which [a crime victim] must show that: (1) she has a clear and 
indisputable right to relief; (2) the district court has a clear duty to act; 
and (3) no other adequate remedy is available to her.”  Id.  Four circuits 
do not follow this standard.  Id. at 532.  The 9th Circuit uses an abuse of 
discretion or legal error standard.  Id. at 533.  The 2nd Circuit uses an 
abuse of discretion standard.  Id.  The 11th Circuit granted a petition 
“without asking whether victim had a clear and indisputable right to 
relief.”  Id.  The 3rd Circuit stated in dicta that “mandamus relief is 
available under a different, and less demanding, standard under 18 
U.S.C. § 3771.”  Id.  The D.C. Circuit adopted the traditional mandamus 
standard because “there is no indication that Congress intended to invoke 
any other standard.”  Id.  The court also reasoned that if Congress 
intended to provide “ordinary appellate review via mandamus [through § 
3771(d)(3)], it is unclear what purpose § 3771 (d)(4) serves by providing 
the government the same thing on direct appeal.”  Id.  Furthermore, the 
D.C. Circuit opined that “the abbreviated 72-hour deadline suggests that 
Congress understood it was providing the traditional ‘extraordinary 
remedy’ of mandamus.”  Id.  Determining whether the lower court 
committed a “clear and indisputable” error within 72 hours is feasible 
because extensive briefing or prolonged deliberation is not normally 
required, whereas “full briefing and plenary appellate review within the 
72-hour hour deadline will almost always be impossible.”  Id.  Thus, the 
D.C. Circuit held that the traditional standard for mandamus applies to 
petitions for mandamus filed under the CVRA.  Id. 
Power to Grant Writ of Habeas Corpus – Mootness:  Rhodes v. 
Judiscak, 653 F.3d 1146 (10th Cir. 2011) 
The 10th Circuit addressed whether a petition for habeas corpus 
relief is moot when it challenges the calculation of an already served 
prison sentence.  Id. at 1148.  The court noted that the 5th and 11th 
Circuits determined that a petition is not moot because a district court 
could consider a favorable ruling as a factor in a later petition for a 
shortened supervised release.  Id. at 1148–49.  The court noted that the 
3rd and D.C. Circuits held that “whether a particular collateral 
consequence is sufficient to defeat mootness turns on the likelihood that 
a favorable decision would redress the injury.”  Id. at 1149.  The 11th 
Circuit agreed with the 3rd and D.C. Circuits, but not based on the low 
likelihood of redress.  Id.  Rather, the court stated that the petition is 
moot because redress is impossible, because neither it nor the district 
could provide a remedy for the harm alleged.  Id.  Thus, the 10th Circuit 
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held that a § 2241 petition for habeas corpus relief challenging only the 
calculation of an already served prison sentence is moot.  Id. 
Witness Tampering – Conduct Under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b):  United 
States v. Doss, 630 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2011) 
The 9th Circuit considered witness tampering under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1512 and addressed “what type of conduct falls within the ambit of” 
the statute’s phrase “corruptly persuades.”  Id. at 1183, 1186.  The court 
noted that the 2nd and 11th Circuits “conclude[d] that persuasion with an 
‘improper purpose’ qualifies (such as self-interest in impeding an 
investigation),” while the 3rd Circuit found that “there must be 
something more inherently wrongful about the persuasion (such as 
bribery or encouraging someone to testify falsely).”  Id. at 1186.  The 9th 
Circuit agreed with the 3rd Circuit, stating that, when a privilege not to 
testify exists, “the phrase ‘corruptly persuades’ cannot mean simply 
‘persuades with the intent to hinder communication to law enforcement’ 
because such an interpretation would render the word ‘corruptly’ 
meaningless.”  Id. at 1187.  In contrast, the 2nd and 11th Circuits found 
the term “corruptly persuade” to include merely persuading a witness to 
invoke his or her legal privileges not to testify.   Id.  Thus, the 9th Circuit 
found that the term “corruptly” is “normally associated with ‘wrongful, 
immoral, depraved, or evil;” therefore, “a defendant could not be shown 
to act with ‘consciousness of wrongdoing’ merely by asking [a witness 
with a legal privilege not to testify] to withhold testimony absent some 
other wrongful conduct, such as coercion, intimidation, bribery, 
suborning perjury, etc.”  Id. at 1189–90. 
IMMIGRATION 
Right of Review – Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine:  Bright v. Holder, 
649 F.3d 397 (5th Cir. 2011) 
The 5th Circuit addressed “whether an alien is a fugitive where . . . 
he has maintained the same address throughout his removal proceedings, 
the address was known to the [Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS)], and DHS made no attempt to locate or arrest the alien following 
his failure to report for removal,” thus barring further review of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals’ removal decision.  Id. at 400.  The court 
noted that the 2nd and 7th Circuits “have applied the fugitive 
disentitlement doctrine in this context, reasoning that even when an 
alien’s location is known, immigration officials must deploy resources to 
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bring him in.  And, of course, he may not be so easy to find once his 
litigation options are exhausted.”  Id. (internal quotations omitted).  
Conversely, the 9th Circuit found “that an alien’s failure to report for 
removal did not make her a fugitive during the pendency of her petition 
for review because her whereabouts were known to her counsel, DHS, 
and the court.”  Id.  The 5th Circuit agreed with the 2nd and 7th Circuits 
in finding that “[a]pplying the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to those 
who evade removal despite their address being known by DHS will 
encourage voluntary surrenders, the efficient operation of the courts, and 
respect for the judiciary and the rule of law.”  Id.  Thus, the 5th Circuit 
concluded that an alien is a fugitive where he has maintained the same 
address throughout his removal proceedings, and the address was known 
to the DHS.   Id. 
REMEDIES 
Restitution Awards – Crime Victims’ Rights Act:  United States v. 
Monzel, 641 F.3d 528 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
The D.C. Circuit addressed the issue of “whether the proximate 
cause requirement in the catch-all category also applies to the preceding 
categories” of the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA).  Id. at 535.  The 
3rd, 9th, and 11th Circuits have held that it does, while the 5th Circuit 
has held that it does not.  Id.  The D.C. Circuit held that all of the 
categories require proximate cause because principles of tort and 
criminal law state that “a defendant is only liable for harms he 
proximately caused.”  Id.  Further, the D.C. Circuit reasoned that since 
18 U.S.C. § 2259 defines “victim” as a person harmed “as a result of” the 
defendant’s offense, the statute invokes the same principle.  Id. at 536.  
Thus, the D.C. Circuit joined the plurality of circuits in holding that the 
proximate cause requirement applies to the all of the categories of 
victim’s losses.  Id. at 535. 
SENTENCING 
Early Release Programs – Bureau of Prisons Policy:  Licon v. 
Ledezma, 638 F.3d 1303 (10th Cir. 2011) 
The 10th Circuit addressed whether a Bureau of Prisons (BOP) 
policy categorically excluding prisoners convicted of felon in possession 
of a firearm charges from eligibility for a parole or early release program 
was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in 
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accordance with the law.”  Id. at 1307.  The court noted that the 3rd, 5th 
and 8th Circuits determined that the BOP provided sufficient justification 
for the policy, while the 9th Circuit found the policy arbitrary and 
capricious due to a lack of a non-arbitrary basis for the categorical 
exclusion.  Id. at 1308–09.  The 10th Circuit agreed with the 3rd, 5th and 
8th Circuits in finding that the policy was not arbitrary or capricious 
because the BOP successfully urged that “the offense conduct of both 
armed offenders and certain recidivists suggests that they pose a 
particular danger to the public.”  Id. at 1309.  The court disagreed with 
the 9th Circuit because the BOP’s justification provided sufficient insight 
into its rationale.  Id. at 1309–10.  Thus, the 10th Circuit concluded that 
the BOP policy was valid as it sufficiently satisfied the arbitrary and 
capricious standard.  Id. at 1309. 
 
